Abstract. This article analyses the extent to which national policies in the highly internationalised environmental sector are influenced by the policy preferences of political parties. The focus is on policy outputs rather than environmental performance as the central indicator of policy change. Based on a discussion of the relevant theoretical literature competing hypotheses are presented. For an empirical test, a dataset is used that includes information on the number of environmental policies adopted in 18 OECD countries at four points in time between 1970 and 2000. The results show that not only international integration, economic development and problem pressure, but also aspects of party politics, influence the number of policies adopted. The number of environmental measures increases if the governmental parties adopt more pro-environmentalist policy positions. This effect remains robust even when controlling for the institutional strength of governments, the left-right position of parties in government, the inclusion of an ecological or left-libertarian party inside the (coalition) government, and the presence of a portfolio that deals exclusively with environmental issues.
Introduction
The question of whether political parties and partisan rule in government have a systematic influence on policy making has received considerable scholarly attention in the last decades (Castles 1982; Kernan 2002; Schmidt 1996) . Traditionally, the research focus was on the left-right party composition of governments and its translation into policies, especially with regard to macroeconomic phenomena like inflation, growth and unemployment, but also fiscal and tax policy as well as aggregate social spending. In recent years, the availability of systematic data on the positions of political parties collected within the 'Comparative Manifesto Project' (CMP; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006 ) offers the basis for more sophisticated analyses.
However, while these research endeavours cover a broad range of policy sectors, we still lack a comprehensive, cross-national study on the impact of the ideological orientations and positions of political parties in governments and legislatures on environmental policy outputs. Existing large-n studies in the field typically focus on environmental performance rather than legislative or executive outputs (King & Borchardt 1994; Jahn 1998 Jahn , 2000 Neumayer 2003; Scruggs 1999 Scruggs , 2003 . This conceptualisation of the dependent variable (which is often motivated by easier data availability), however, entails severe validity problems. It does not allow for sound tests of partisan influences as they are theoretically conceived to affect policy outputs rather than substantive policy impacts. Shifts in environmental quality may be brought about by many factors not related to national policy change, such as implementation deficits or increases in environmentally damaging behaviour. Pollutant emission changes, the 'standard' operationalisation in available studies, are not necessarily the result of political measures, but might be caused by a plethora of other factors.
The research deficit is striking as the environmental field constitutes a particularly interesting case for assessing potential party influences. Given the transboundary scope of many environmental problems, national environmental policy -from its very beginnings in the 1960s -was strongly affected by international cooperation and supranational regulation at the level of the European Union (EU). Hence, the detection of a significant influence of political parties despite the presence of far-reaching international or supranational cooperation could be interpreted as strong support for the 'parties matter' hypothesis.
Against this backdrop, this article provides a systematic analysis of the extent to which political parties affect national environmental policy outputs. We study not only potential effects of the parties' left-right orientation, but also the impact of the environmental policy positions of governments. Related to partisan impacts, we also test for the role of institutional constraints. In addition, we control for two other groups of factors that are generally seen as major driving forces of environmental policy-making -namely the impact of international factors (in particular supranational law as well as trade) and domestic factors (socio-economic conditions and environmental problem pressure).
To measure changes in environmental outputs, we rely on the ENVIPOL-CON dataset (Holzinger et al. 2008a (Holzinger et al. , 2008b . Our results reveal that the number of environmental measures adopted is affected not only by the integration of a country into supranational organisations and macro-economic conditions, but also by the programmatic orientation of the government's parties on environmentalism, while the existence of a cabinet portfolio has also some impact. We further demonstrate that relying on a mere left-right dimension is insufficient for analysing environmental policy making. Rather it is necessary to refer to a conflict dimension that reflects the importance of environmental issues for each party represented in a country's government. We also find evidence that higher institutional constraints seem to hinder the adoption of environmental policies.
Theory and hypotheses
Two strands of research are of relevance for this study: research on the partisan impact on policies; and existing explanations for environmental policy change. On this basis, we distinguish between five groups of factors that account for differences in environmental policy developments across countries and over time: partisan politics; government formation and cabinet structure; institutional constraints; international factors; and domestic problem pressure.
Partisan politics
Our argument in the tradition of classical partisan politics models as developed by Hibbs (1977 Hibbs ( , 1992 and Tufte (1978) and the 'parties do matter' hypotheses (Schmidt 1996 (Schmidt ,2002 ) is straightforward. As parties from different ideological backgrounds that represent different constituencies should strive for different policy goals in order to gain re-election, different policy choices across space and time in modern democracies should be attributable to the varying composition of governments and legislatures. Parties that compete for votes need to implement those policies that satisfy their voters (Downs 1957) once they control decision making. The objectives of office-seeking and the realisation of policy goals are heavily interwoven (Muller & Strf,?lm 1999; Strf,?lm 1990) . Indeed, important research contributions have demonstrated that parties in government deliver those policies promised in their platforms (Budge & Laver 1993; Klingemann et al. 1994; McDonald & Budge 2005) . It can hence be expected that the positions of parties in governments should at least to some extent translate into policy outputs. The strength of proenvironmental preferences of parties in government should be observable at the policy level.
Most studies assessing whether political parties matter for policy making start from the expectation that the left-right composition of governments and/or legislatures is the crucial dimension that accounts for the differential impact of parties. For many policy areas, this distinction seems plausible. This holds true, for instance, for early research efforts related to the impact of political parties on macro-economic policies such as inflation, unemployment and economic growth (Alvarez et al. 1991; Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1978; see Franzese (2002) for an overview). The same statement applies to analyses in the fields of fiscal and tax policy (Blais et al. 1993; Brauninger 2005; Cusack 1997; Cusack & Beramendi 2006) as well as social policy (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Hicks & Swank 1992; Huber et al. 1993) .
However, while the basic opposing preferences in modern democraciesalong a left-right scale -are relatively clear-cut and comparatively easy to determine for the above-mentioned highest priority policy areas (Klingemann et al. 1994) , this is the case to a lesser extent for environmental policy. Environmental issues cut across the left-right dimension when looking at specific party families (Gallagher et al. 2006: 230-254; Mair & Mudde 1998) . For policy preferences of the centre-right wing parties, such as those of the Christiandemocratic party family or other parties that stress religious aspects, the protection of the environment might be important in terms of saving 'God's creation'. At the same time, socialist or social-democratic parties as political actors from the left-wing ideological spectrum might prefer economic growth over environmental protection to secure employment for their core voter clientele (Neumayer 2003: 218) . Thus, the left-right dimension should be of minor importance for explaining the variance in environmental policy developments over time and across countries.
This ambiguous theoretical picture is also mirrored by existing empirical studies, although these suffer from the above-mentioned problem of focusing on performance rather than policy outputs as the dependent variable. King and Borchardt (1994) find a moderate inverse impact of left party strength on air pollution. Jahn (1998 Jahn ( , 2000 and Neumayer (2003) report a positive relationship between left-wing party strength in parliament and environmental performance, while for left-wing government control such effects can not be detected. Scruggs (1999) , contrary to Jahn and Neumayer, finds largely insignificant results regarding the impact of left-libertarian or green parties on an aggregate index of environmental performance. These ambiguous findings, however, should not be interpreted to mean that parties' environmental policy positions are of minor explanatory importance, as the environment is only considered a 'second order issue' in electoral campaigns (Guber 2001) . Several studies have demonstrated that in Western democracies environmental protection has some salience (e.g., Knutsen 1989; Rohrschneider 1988 Rohrschneider , 1993 . This is also evident in the emergence of ecological movements during the 1970s that paved the way for contemporary green parties in Western countries (MiillerRommel 1989; Richardson & Rootes 1995) . The fact that environmental issues are of considerable importance in party competition is also documented in recent studies on elections in Germany and the United States (Davis & Wurth 2003; Debus 2007; List & Sturm 2006) . From these considerations, we derive the following hypotheses:
HI: The more parties represented in government stress the requirement of environmental protection, the higher will be the number of environmental policies adopted.
H2:
The number of environmental policies adopted is not dependent upon the overall left-or right-wing orientation of parties in the national governments.
Government formation and cabinet structure
In the literature on government formation, parties are typically assumed to have one of two motives (Laver & Schofield 1998: 89-123) . While the officeseeking approach considers only the strength of a political party as a unitary actor within a legislature (Peleg 1981; Riker 1962; Van Deemen 1989; Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) , policy-driven theories take the programmatic positions of parties on an overall left-right scale into account (Axelrod 1970; De Swaan 1973) . A number of studies show that there is an independent impact of the degree of ideological distance between the parties on government formation. This is not only true for an overall left-right scale (Martin & Stevenson 2001) , but also for the distance between political parties in various policy areas (Debus 2009; Warwick 2006) . The common perspective is that during the negotiations, coalition governments agree on the mean of the programmatic positions of all participating parties, weighted by the seat share each party brings to the government's majority (Cusack 1997 (Cusack ,2001 .
Moreover, several studies stress the relevance of the cabinet structure and the decision rules inside a government (Andeweg 1993; Laver & Shepsle 1994) as well as the existence of coalition policy agreements for the number and content of policy outputs (Muller & Str~m 2008; Timmermans 1998 Timmermans ,2006 ). An approach that not only takes the programmatic positions of parties into account, but also highlights the relevance of the cabinet structure and the role of the heads of each ministry is the seminal portfolio allocation model developed by Laver and Shepsle (1990,1996) . They presume that coalition cabinets are based on ministerial discretion. Cabinet ministers have 'considerable influence' over governmental decision making in their area of jurisdiction (Laver & Shepsle 1998: 34) .
These theoretical considerations suggest that the number of policies adopted should increase if an environmental ministry exists. Moreover, and in line with the ministerial discretion approach, the policy position of the party that controls the portfolio should matter for the policy output. If a minister for environmental affairs belongs to a party attaching high salience to environmental protection, this should positively affect the number of environmental policies adopted. Hence, we formulate:
The number of environmental policies adopted increases if a ministry exists that deals explicitly with environmental protection.
H4:
If a ministry for environmental affairs exists and if it is controlled by a party that gives environmental issues a higher saliency than the other governmental parties, the number of environmental policies adopted increases.
Institutional constraints
While there is a broad consensus that institutional constraints matter for policy making, and hence for the ability to adopt new policies, the scholarly discussion is basically characterised by two opposing views on the direction of that impact. Emphasising the positive influence of institutional constraints on the policy performance of political systems, Lijphart (1999) investigated the effects of different institutional settings in democratic systems. He distinguishes consensus democracies from majoritarian democracies, arguing that democracies' encompassing elements that increase the necessity for consensual decisions generally perform better or at least no worse than those whose decisions are based upon majoritarian rule. Consensual institutions -for example, proportional electoral systems resulting in multi-party legislatures, (broad) coalitions and collegial executives -have a greater capacity to represent diffuse groups (including environmental interests) and are less susceptible to the influence of special interest groups.
The veto player approach as developed by Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( ,2002 , however, questions this expectation. Tsebelis looks at the number and constellation of actors that are involved in decision-making processes and whose consent is necessary for changing the status quo. He hypothesises that policy change becomes more difficult, ceteris paribus, with a growing number of veto players. While Tsebelis also emphasises that the stability of the status quo grows not only with the number of veto players but also with constellations of the veto players' preferences, the most important point for our analysis is the simple numerical aspect of such institutional constraints (i.e., the number of veto players). In that regard, a higher level of institutional constraints should hinder policy changes, including adoptions of new policies. Following Tsebelis' (1995 veto player theory, the more institutional constraints exist in a polity, the lower the number of environmental policies adopted.
H5:
H6: Following Lijphart's (1999) approach on institutional constellations in different types of democracies, the more institutional constraints exist in a polity, the higher the number of environmental policies adopted.
International factors: International cooperation and economic integration
In the literature on environmental policy change, it is well acknowledged that domestic policies are strongly affected by exogenous factors. We generally find a distinction between effects emerging from regulatory cooperation between states at the international or supranational level and regulatory competition driven by growing economic inter-linkages (Holzinger & Knill 2005; Holzinger et al. 2008a) .
International cooperation presupposes the existence of interdependencies pushing governments to resolve common problems through cooperation within international or supranational institutions. Once established, institutional arrangements constrain and shape the domestic policy choices, even as they are constantly altered by their member states. In this way, international institutions are not only the object of state choice, but at the same time consequential for subsequent governmental activities (Martin & Simmons 1998: 743) . In the environmental field, the need [or international cooperation is particularly pronounced because of the transboundary and global scope of many environmental problems. Hence, cooperation and harmonisation activities often resulting in binding legal accords have always been an important factor shaping domestic policy choices.
While domestic effects are well documented for international regimes and institutions (Holzinger et al. 2008a; Miles et al. 2002) , it is especially the domestic impact of EU legislation that is of major relevance for environmental policy outputs in the Member States (Jordan & Liefferink 2004; Knill 2001) . In the underlying study, we hence only consider the possible impact of EU membership. This is also justified as the EU and other international institutions crucially differ in the extent to which compliance with legal obligation actually can be enforced. In the EU, such powers are comparatively well developed, given the direct effect and the supremacy of EU law. Considering the strong EU conditionality impact on applicant countries (e.g., Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004), we also acknowledge potential EU effects on countries that are in the accession phase.
Exogenous factors that affect national environmental policies are not restricted to international cooperation, but might also emerge from economic inter-linkages between countries in the context of the global integration of national markets. Research in this field resulted in an enormous output. However, the causal relationship between trade effects and environmental policy is theoretically undetermined. On the one hand, it is often expected that economic openness increases competitive pressures on national regulations, resulting in a 'race to the bottom' of environmental standards (Holzinger 2003) . On the other hand, ambitious environmental policies might also be a comparative advantage by stimulating innovation resulting in economic growth (Janicke & Jacob 2004; Porter & Van der Linde 1995; see Bernauer et al. 2007 for an overview) . Thus, it remains unclear if and to what extent economic openness and trade inter-linkages have an impact on national environmental policies. Empirical research finds contrary evidence, reaching from a shift towards stricter regulations (Vogel 1995) to domestic attempts of deregulation and dismantling (De Sombre 2008; for overviews, see Huang & Labys 2002; Kirkpatrick & Scrieciu 2008) . Here, we follow the approach mentioned second and hypothesise that economic openness has a positive impact on the number of environmental policies enacted. We derive the following hypotheses:
H7: If a country is a member or applicant state of the EU, the number of environmental policies adopted will increase.
H8:
The number of environmental policies adopted increases with the economic openness of a country.
Domestic problem pressure
Many studies emphasise the impact of the level and changes of problem pressure as well as the role of economic development for the adoption of environmental policies (Harrington et al. 2005; Janicke & Weidner 1997; Weidner & Janicke 2002) . In fact, environmental policy did not emerge as an abstract idea but was the response to deteriorating environmental surroundings often threatening human health. In constellations of high or increasing ecological problems, we should therefore expect an increase in regulatory outputs -regardless of the political parties represented in government and their environmental policy positions. Domestic problem pressure, however, is not only affected by ecological conditions, but also by the economic development of a country. Economic development might cause an increase in ecological problems, mainly through externalities emerging from growing industrial production (such as resource consumption, energy demand or pollutant emissions). Besides, the level of economic development directly affects the fiscal, technological as well as institutional and administrative resources that are required to develop effective policy solutions (e.g., Weidner & Janicke 2002 ). Finally, with higher levels of economic development, we can generally expect a higher relevance of nonmaterial values within societies (Inglehart 1995 (Inglehart , 1997 . As a result, higher levels of wealth also entail a stronger demand for environmental protection. In economic terms, environmental regulation is thus a 'luxury good'. Therefore we expect:
H9:
The higher the level of economic development, the higher will be the number of environmental policies adopted.
HlO: The higher the ecological problem pressure a country faces, the higher will be the number of environmental policies adopted.
Empirical findings

Data sources and descriptive results
To obtain information on the characteristics of our dependent variable, we rely on the ENVIPOLCON dataset (Holzinger et al. 2008a (Holzinger et al. , 2008b . The ENVI-POLCON data contain information on the number of policies adopted for central environmental problem areas and sub fields in 24 OECD and transition countries at four points in time (1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000) -hence for a 30-year time frame. The data include 40 preselected environmental policy measures that cover a broad range of environmental spheres, including air and water pollution control as well as soil protection, nature conservation and overarching principles like sustainable development. They encompass only general and comparable measures across countries (as opposed to individual or case-based decisions). Although countries might have other policies adopted instead of the preselected ones, it is important to note that all states in the sample in principle had the chance to enact them within the time frame. As the policies refer strictly to legislative and executive outputs, we refrain from weighing the several policies differently, though it is, of course, always debatable whether some policies are more important than others. To compare the changes in policy outputs across countries and over time, we analyse the number of policies out of this sample of 40 policies that had been adopted by a given country at a certain point in time.
l The data were collected with the help of expert surveys and by collaborative research efforts based on exploiting national and international legal databases and other primary as well as secondary sources (see Heichel et al. 2008) .
On this basis, we constructed a cumulative index that provides information on the number of environmental policies that were in place in each of the countries at each of the four points in time. As shown in Table 1 , there is an upward trend in environmental policy adoptions. While in 1970, the number of policies adopted ranged between zero (Ireland) and ten (Sweden), ten years later, every country in our sample had adopted at least three measures. In 1990, around 16 environmental policies were in force on average, while the arithmetic mean in 2000 reached a value of 28. There is, however, still a high degree Mean (SO) 4.9 (2.4) 9.7 (3.5) 16.4 (3.8) 28.1 (5.2) Source: Own calculations based on the ENVIPOLCON dataset (Holzinger et al. 2008a (Holzinger et al. , 2008b .
of variation in the number of environmental policies adopted among the countries under investigation.
To estimate the positions of parties in government in the period between 1970 and 2000, we refer to the data from the CMP Klingemann et al. 2006) . The work of the CMP resulted in a large and complex database that includes party saliencies on 56 policy issues for more than 3,000 election manifestos from 54 countries since 1945. While the dataset established by the CMP bears methodological problems because of its approach of coding saliencies rather than positions (Benoit et al. 2009; Laver 2001; Mikhaylov et al. 2008 ) and a number of alternative methods for estimating the positions of political actors exist (e.g., Laver & Garry 2000; Laver et al. 2003; Slapin & Proksch 2008) , the manifesto data of the CMP covers the programmatic statements of all relevant parties in the OECD countries over a long time period. In this way, we can account for -potentially emerging -changes in the left-right placements and the environmental protection orientation of political actors. While a left-right dimension is already provided by the CMP dataset (Budge & Klingemann 2001) ,2 no common environmental policy dimension exists. However, the CMP coding scheme includes two categories that deal with issues related to environmental policy. The more parties formulate 'quasisentences' in their election manifestos that belong to the categories 'antigrowth economy' (per416) and 'environmental protection' (per501), the more they are assumed to be in favour of pro-environmental legislative proposals. An alternative to this environmental policy saliency index would be the application of the Gal-Tan index created by Hooghe et al. (2002; d. Dalton 2009 ). However, in contrast to the latter, which differentiates between left-libertarian and right-authoritarian positions in general, our index explicitly deals with environmental issues and the relationship between the environment and economy, excluding libertarian aspects. We hence rely on the more explicit environmental policy saliency index as it is explicitly related to our research question.
The CMP data is included in the dataset 'Parties, Governments and Legislatures' compiled by Cusack & Engelhardt (2002) , which provides not only information on the partisan composition of each government, but also on the strength of parliamentary parties and the composition of the cabinet. On this basis, we calculated the government's 'centre of gravity' (Cusack 1997; Gross & Sigelman 1984) . This allows for estimating the overall position of a government for both the left-right and the environmental policy dimension.
3 As legislative decision making and, therefore, the adoption of polices takes time (Martin & Vanberg 2004) , it is necessary to consider more than the environmental policy position and the left-right orientation of governments at the four points in time for which we have data on the number of environmental policies adopted. We also have to take the ideological and environmental policy orientation of the former governments into account. For this reason, we refer to the arithmetic mean of the centres of gravity on the left-right and on the environmental policy dimension for the governments that have been elected in the ten years before each of our observation time points.
To test the robustness of our estimates, we additionally use an alternative measure of the government's policy preferences. Referring to Tsebelis' (1995 Tsebelis' ( , 2002 ) work on 'veto players', we construct two variables. First, we include the position of the least environmentally friendly party in government. If a party (as a unitary actor) in a coalition government fulfils the criteria of a (partisan) veto player, then a government should agree on the policy preferences of the environmentally most sceptical party, because otherwise it risks the breakdown of the coalition and, therefore, the loss of control of executive offices. Neumayer's (2004; cf. Dalton 2009) findings, left-wing parties and therefore governments dominated by leftist political actors are more environmentally friendly than right-wing governments. If this is correct, we should find a significant impact of the left-right position of the government on the number of environmental policies in force at one point in time when explicitly looking at the most left-wing partisan actor in government.
To account for institutional constraints, we use the 'Polcon V' dataset created by Henisz (2000 Henisz ( ,2002 and the index of executive dominance developed by Lijphart (1999: 116-142,313) . The Polcon V data provide information on the level of political discretion a governments has. It covers the institutional characteristics and their impact on governments for all OEeD countries and developing countries for a longer time period. The higher the score of the index, which ranges from 0 to 1, the lower is the political discretion of a government to implement its policy positions. The measure by Lijphart (1999) covers a similar phenomenon by looking at the power of a government to implement its preferences. The higher Lijphart's index of executive dominance, the stronger a government should be. If institutional constraints play a role for the number of environmental policy standards implemented in the way Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 2002 expects (see HS), then the estimated regression coefficient of the Polcon V index should be significantly negative, while the Lijphart index should have a significantly positive direction. If H6 is correct, then the estimated coefficient of the Polcon V index should be significantly positive, whereas Lijphart's (1999) index of executive dominance should have a statistically negative regression coefficient. The mean score of the Polcon V Index is 0.76 for the country sample in this study. It varies between 0.36 (Greece in the 1990s) and 0.89 (Belgium in 2000). When applying Lijphart's (1999) index of executive dominance, the mean score in our country sample is 2.95. The United States and Switzerland have the lowest score of 1.0, which means that the executive is quite weak in both states, while the United Kingdom, France and Germany for the time period since 1971 receive scores of 5.52, implying that the national governments in those three states are quite strong. Table 2 as well as Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview on the governments' centres of gravity regarding the overall left-right axis and the environmental policy dimension in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The environmental policy dimension used here hypothetically could vary between '0' and '100'. A score of '0' would indicate that no governmental parties emphasised friendly points of view on environmental protection or sceptical positions on the risks of economic growth in their election manifestos. A value of '100', by contrast, would mean that the election manifestos of all governmental parties include only 'quasi-sentences' that belong to the categories 'anti-growth economy' Table 2 . Mean of the government's centre of gravity on an environmental policy dimension (EP) and a left-right axis (LR) in the time periods between 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 
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(per416) and/or 'environmental protection' (perSOl). As the data reveal, there are clear changes in the environmental and the left-right positions of the governments. In most of the countries, environmental protection becomes a more salient issue for governments over time (see Figure 1 below), whichaccording to the CMP coding scheme -implies that national governments adopted more pro-environmental policy positions. Yet, this upward trend stopped in the 1990s in some of the countries under investigation. In Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland, the governments adopted less environmentally friendly positions than in the decades before. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands, by contrast, environmental protection continuously became more important, but on a lower level. The United States, together with Portugal and Japan, show no clear trend in either direction. In these countries, the governments are most sceptical with regard to environmental issues (see Table 2 ). When turning to the positions of the governments on the left-right axis for the four points in time, no clear patterns emerge (Figure 2 and Table 2 ). In Austria, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, for instance, the governments' position moved to the right on the overall left-right axis. Only in Greece, Portugal and France did the governmental parties continuously adopt more leftist positions over time. In the remaining countries the position of the centres of gravity of governments changed between slightly left-wing and slightly right-wing positions over our four observation points.
For the -potential-impact of ministerial discretion on the policy output of a government (Laver & Shepsle 1990 ,1996 , the Cusack & Engelhardt (2002) dataset enables us to identify whether a ministry dealing with environmental affairs existed. Furthermore, the dataset allows for the identification of the party that controlled that portfolio and hence allows us to assign a policy position to that minister. While by 1970, no cabinet with a portfolio for environmental affairs existed, this number rose to nine by 1980. The number of environmental ministries further increased to 12 in 1990 (66.7 per cent) and IS (83.3 per cent) in 2000, with only the Austrian, Swiss and American cabinets remaining without an exclusively environmental minister.
While the data described so far allow for testing the connection between the left-right position of governments and their environmental policy orientation, the inclusion of further data that reflect economic integration and domestic problem pressure is required. To account for problem pressure, we include data for the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, energy use and population density for the years 1970,1980,1990 and 2000. Figures are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2007).5 With regard to international influences on environmental policy outputs, we include information on the EU membership of the countries under study. Another variable identifies those countries that became members of the EU in the following decade, so that potentially existing adaptation effects are covered. To measure economic openness, we rely on a country's trade volume as a percentage of GDP (also taken from the World Development Indicators).6 Additionally, we control for the participation of green parties in government. Information on the latter is derived from the comparative study on coalition governments by Muller & Str0m (2000) .
We end up with 18 countries for which data on all variables for almost all points in time are available (see Table 1 above). In the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain the year 1970 cannot be included in the analysis because there are no data on party policy positions during the time of authoritarian regimes in those three countries.
Analysis
To test the hypotheses formulated above, we calculate a number of linear regression models that take into account the panel character of our data (Beck & Katz 1995; Pltimper et al. 2005) . Our dependent variable is the number of environmental policies adopted in one country at one point in time -that is, in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 . Obviously, the number of policies in force at time point ( depends on the number of policies that already had been enacted at time point (-1. Strategies to cope with this problem are the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a further explanatory variable in each model or the selection of the difference between the numbers of policies in force between two points in time as the dependent variable. Both strategies bear the risk of the 'small N, large V' problem. In both cases, we would lose one observation per country, implying a reduction of case numbers from 69 to 5l. Apart from this, the methodological question of whether the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable actually captures dynamic effects in political processes is still highly contested (e.g., Achen 2000; Keele & Kelly 2006).
One may argue, by contrast, that the number of policies already adopted represents the status quo and should therefore be included as an explanatory variable, either as a lagged dependent variable or by using the change in the number of policies in force between two points in time. We therefore recalculate our first bloc of regression models, in which the number of policies adopted is used as the dependent variable and which do not include the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory factor (see Table 3 ). Models 8-14, presented in Table 4 , include the lagged dependent variable as a further independent variable. In models 15-21, we use the change of environmental policies enacted between two points in time as the dependent variable (see Table 5 ).As the results show, all regression models deliver similar results that are broadly in line with our hypotheses despite the loss of 18 cases and one observation period per country.
In each table, the first model accounts for factors that reflect the international institutional and economic integration of a country and the domestic problem pressure. The independent variables included refer to EU membership or EU applicant status, trade openness, GDP per capita, energy use as well as population density. We expected the actual and the prospective EU membership of a country to increase the number of environmental policies adopted, while a country's economic openness, should have a positive impact as well. We further hypothesised that higher overall economic development results in more policy adoptions. A similar relationship should exist for the problem pressure variables. The results of the first regression model, which explains more than 60 per cent of the variance, show that if a country is a member of the EU, the number of environmental policies enacted significantly increases. There is no statistically significant effect for applicant states, but the coefficient of this variable has the expected positive sign.
7 However, the regression models presented in Table 3 show no statistically significant impact of trade volume on the number of policies adopted.
With respect to our socio-economic and problem pressure variables, in two of three cases we get results that contradict our hypotheses. While we see the expected positive effect of GDP per capita, the remaining variables that cover information on the energy use per capita and the population density of a country display statistically significant negative signs. This implies that a high popUlation density and a strong demand for energy per capita result in a lower environmental policy output. This finding contradicts the results of other studies that emphasise problem pressure (e.g., Weidner & Janicke 2002) . A possible reason for this might be our focus on the number of policies adopted rather than the regulatory stringency of these measures.
The second group of models (models 2,3 and 4) covers variables that reflect the ideological approach, the portfolio allocation model and institutional constraints. The independent variables are the governments' centres of gravity on the ideological left-right dimension and on the environmental policy dimension. 8 To test whether the 'centre of gravity' is a misleading measure, we refer in the third model to the policy position of the least pro-environmental governmental party. Furthermore, we use the most leftist governmental party and its position on the left-right-axis as an indicator for the whole government's ideological orientation. If the left-right position of political actors is of more relevance for the environmental policy output of a government than the saliency of environmental issues, the estimated coefficient of the left-right position of the government rather than the coefficient for the environmental issue saliency measure should be statistically significant from zero. Moreover, we account for the fact that administrative structures have an effect on the policy outputs by including a dummy variable that is coded '1' if a separate ministry for environmental affairs existed and '0' otherwise. Additionally, we include an interaction effect of the existence of an environmental ministry with the environmental policy position of the respective minister's party. The policy distance between the minister who controls the environmental policy department and the 'centre of gravity' of the government on the environmental dimension allows us to test not only whether the structure of the administration influences environmental policy making, but also whether a more environmentally friendly minister pushes the adoption of new policies. The latter aspect allows for testing the portfolio allocation model. The inclusion of the green government party dummy enables us to analyse whether it is sufficient to look only at the partisan composition of a government or whether a more detailed measurement of the programmatic orientation of political parties and the government structure is required to account for changes in environmental policy outputs. We further control for the partisan composition of the government by including a dummy variable that is coded as '1' if an ecological party or a left-libertarian party was part of country's government during at least one of the decades under study.9 To account for institutional constraints, we incorporate the PoIcon V index (Henisz 2000 (Henisz , 2002 and the index of executive dominance developed by Lijphart (1999) .
As the results of the models 2, 3 and 4 reveal, three of the five variables that reflect the ideological and 'politics' viewpoint have an impact on the number of policies enacted. Variables with an ideological background explain roughly 50 per cent of the overall variance. All variables have the expected sign. Not only the inclusion of green parties in a coalition government, but also the extent to which governmental parties stress environmentalism in their election manifestos, have positive and significant impacts on the number of policy adoptions. There is, however, no evidence that governments with a more left-wing ideological 'centre of gravity' or a strong leftwing party positively influence the number of policy adoptions. The estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero. In addition, the existence of an environmental ministry has a positive and significant impact on the number of policies adopted. By contrast, we find no impact of the policy position of the minister that controls the environmental portfolio. While the cabinet structure matters for environmental policy outputs, our statistical analysis provides no support for the relevance of ministerial discretion, as would have been expected from Laver & Shepsle (1990 , 1996 . There is also evidence that institutional arrangements in the form of the strength of the executive play a role for the overall number of policy adoptions. While the Polcon V index is not statistically significant, the Lijphart index of executive dominance yields positive and significant results. Do these results remain stable when controlling for international integration and the socio-economic development of a country by combining the first model with models 2, 3 and 4? As the results of our third group of regression models show, the inclusion of these variables increases the share of explained variance to more than 75 per cent. There is no major change in the statistical significance or the direction of the coefficients when comparing them to the first and the second model. It is only the variable that identifies whether an environmental ministry exists that is significant in model 7. Furthermore, Lijphart's executive strength index is no longer significant. The Polcon V index, however, has now a statistically significant and negative direction: the higher the score of the Polcon V index (i.e., the less discretion a government has), the lower is the number of environmental policies that are in force. This result, confirming HS, is in line with the veto players approach by Tsebelis (2002) and contradicts H6 based on Lijphart's arguments. Indeed, not only factors like international integration, macro-economic development and measures for problem pressure affect the level of environmental policy outputs, but also the cabinet structure, the institutional design and the environmental policy saliency of members of government seem to matter. The latter is the case for both the presence of a green and libertarian party in the government and the degree of environmental issue saliency of the government, regardless of whether it is measured by the centre of gravity or the preference of the most sceptical government party on environmental issues.
As already mentioned, the use of the mere number of adopted policies at one point in time may yield misleading results. We therefore replicate the regression models presented in Table 3 by including the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable (see Table 4 ). In addition, we use the difference between the numbers of environmental policies in force between two time points as the dependent variable (see Table 5 ). The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable does not result in major changes in the direction or significance of the coefficients presented in Table 3 . While the number of environmental policies in force at t-1 has a highly significant and positive impact on the number of adopted policies at t, we still find evidence for our argument that the environmental issue saliency of governments plays a positive and significant role at least in the unified models that include variables from all theoretical accounts discussed in this article (see Table 4 ). This holds true despite the fact that we lose 18 observations due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. There are, however, two major differences. First, the dummy variable that provides information on the participation of a green or left-libertarian party is no longer significant. Second, the centre of gravity of the government on the left-right dimension now has a significant and negative impact according to the results of models 12-14 and 19-21. This implies thatin contrast to the unified models presented in Table 3 -more leftist governments adopt more environmental policies than governments located on the right of the ideological spectrum. While the alternative measurement in the form of the most left-wing government party does not show any significant impact, the results presented in Table 4 do not support the insignificance of the general left-right orientation for the number of environmental policies adopted as was indicated by the regressions models in Table 3 (contradiction of H2). Furthermore, the share of trade on GDP in each country now has a significantly positive impact: the more a country is involved in international trade, the more environmental policies are adopted (HS) .
To further cross-validate our results, we refer to the change in the number of environmental policies between 1970 and 1980,1980 and 1990, and 1990 and the year 2000 as the dependent variable (see Table 5 ). The results are very similar to the findings based on the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. All macro-economic factors and variables that reflect international integration have a similar direction and -mostly -similar level of significance as in the models presented in Tables 3 and 4 . According to models 1,5 and 6 in Table 5 , economic openness -measured by the share of trade on the GDP -has a significant and positive impact on the number of environmental policy standards. Also institutional constraints -measured with the Polcon V index -still have a significant impact in the same direction as reported in the regression models presented in Tables 3 and 4 . This is also the case for the environmental issue saliency of governmental parties. The more they stress environmental issues in their election manifestos, the more environmental policies are adopted. Similar to the results in Table 4 , we find that more left-wing governments are likely to adopt more environmental policies than right-wing governments. This finding, though in contrast to our expectation, is in line with the conventional point of view (see, e.g., Neumayer 2003) . It implies that the general ideological conflict is of relevance for governmental policy outputs. However, as the regression models with their different measures of the dependent and the ideological variables display, it is not only the left-right orientation of political actors that has an impact on policy outputs, but also the sector-specific policy preference of the parties that constitute the executive.
Considering the roots of environmentalism in developed democracies, this finding seems plausible. In line with the results reported by Neumayer (2004) , who identified left-libertarian parties as more environmentally friendly than other left-wing parties, one can argue that belonging to a specific party family and also the metric positioning of parties on a left-right axis help to explain their position on environmental protection (Dalton 2009: 166-170) . Christian-democratic parties, for instance, favour environmental protection because of their 'creationist' religious background (Zolleis 2008: 83-85) , but are normally located slightly to the right of the centre on a left-right dimension. The finding that sector-specific dimensions or indices are at least as powerful as the overall left-right dimension indicates the need to explain policy outputs from other sectors on the basis of sector-specific measures of the political actors' preferences.
To sum up, we find mixed support for our ten hypotheses (see Table 6 ). While the environmental preferences of government parties playa significant role for policy output (HI), there is no clear evidence that the existence of an environmental ministry has an impact on the number of the environmental policies (H3). There is, in addition, no evidence that the respective minister's environmental policy preference is of significant relevance, so that our fourth hypothesis has to be rejected. Contrary to our expectations, the left-right dimension is not unimportant (H2). The analysis also supports Tsebelis' (1995 Tsebelis' ( ,2002 rather than Lijphart's (1999) argument (H5 and H6) : the less discretion a government has (the more veto players exist), the less likely is a change of the status quo in terms of the number of policies. Being a member of the EU significantly increases the number of environmental policies enacted, while there is no indication that applicant status already results in a higher number of adoptions (H7) . Concerning economic factors (H8 and H9), we find support for our expectation on economic openness and economic development. Both variables positively influence the number of environmental policy standards. There is, by contrast, no indication that environmental problem pressure, as measured here, results in a higher number of enacted environmental policies (HlO).
Conclusion
The central objective of this article was to analyse the influence of political parties and their policy preferences on national environmental policy outputs. In contrast to existing studies that rely on the problematic proxy of environmental performance rather than legislative and executive outputs, the underlying analysis addresses an important research gap. Moreover, the objective was to investigate the influence of party politics in a policy field that is characterised by a high degree of internationalisation.
We derived hypotheses from five major theoretical backgrounds -the partisan politics approach; the ministerial discretion approach; institutional constraints; international and economic integration; and domestic problem pressure -to explain the number of environmental policies adopted in 18 OEeD countries. We tested our expectations by using a unique dataset that contains information on the number of policy adoptions in 40 predefined environmental issue areas at four points in time (1970,1980,1990 and 2000) .
The results show that not only international integration, economic development and problem pressure, but also party politics influence the number of adopted policies. More specifically, the number of environmental measures increases if the governmental parties adopt more pro-environmentalist policy positions. This effect remains robust even when controlling for the institutional strength of governments, the left-right position of parties in government, the inclusion of an ecological or left-libertarian party inside the (coalition) government and the presence of a portfolio that deals exclusively with environmental issues. Furthermore, variations in the measurement of the dependent variable and the sample of independent variables resulted in very similar results.
The stability and robustness of our findings is not only highly relevant for studies on outputs in other policy areas, especially regulatory policies, but also implies that merely focusing on the left-right position of political actors is insufficient for a proper understanding of the legislative and executive output in policy fields over time and across countries. The latter should be especially relevant for other issue areas that cut across a left-right conflict dimension, like policies regarding moral questions such as euthanasia, stem cell research or tobacco consumption.
Notes
1. Australia, Canada and New Zealand are not included in the ENVIPOLCON dataset. We exclude transition countries, part of the dataset, in our study. As the output data are based on national policy adoptions, countries with strong decentralisation of environmental policy competencies might display a lower number of adoptions. However, legislative environmental federa lism is hardly relevant in most federal countries of our sample. This holds true for Switzerland and Belgium (in the latter case, at least until the mid-1990s).
The only difficult case is the United States. We hence additionally calculated our regression models by excluding the United States. This did not change either the significance or the direction of the estimated coefficients. 2. The CMP dataset also provides a measure of the degree of economic liberalism of an election manifesto ('markecon'). Since we are interested in the relationship between the environmentalist orientation of a party and its position on a general left-right dimension, we refer to the additive left-right index 'rile' provided by the CMP dataset and also used in the studies by Neumayer (2003 Neumayer ( ,2004 . We recalculated all regression models with the markecon-dimension instead of 'rile', which led to only minor changes in the significance level of the estimated coefficients. For our purpose it is sufficient to stick with the very simple and conservative measure that the least environmental friendly coalition party sets the government's policy agenda for environmental issues. 5. The GOP per capita is measured in 2000 constant international dollars, while the indicator for energy use is the consumption of oil in kg equivalent per capita. Population density is simply estimated by the number of people per square kilometre. In the case of Germany in 1970, data on the GOP are not available from the WOI. We refer to data for 1971 to fill this gap. 6. Trade is measured by the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by the GOP. 7. Additionally, we tested whether 'quasi EU membership' has an impact on the number of environmental policies enacted (not reported in the regression tables) . We included an additional variable that identifies Norway and Switzerland in the years 1990 and 2000 as 'quasi E U members'. The variable itself has no significant impact and does not change the direction or significance level of the remaining explanatory variables. 8. Note that the correlation between these variables for our country sample and the selected time period is 0.138 (Pearson's r) . We therefore include both variables in our model to identify the relevant conflict measure for the adoption of environmental policies. 9. The classification of parties follows Swank (2002) (see, for an overview, Neumayer 2004: 169) .
